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Modernism and Postmodernism 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
Ethan Smith 
 
As the entry implies, postmodernism names any concerted reaction against 
"modernism." Unfortunately, the nature of "modernism" as it refers to an era in 
Western European thought is a contested story. Of course, champions of modernism tell 
the story as one of human evolution from primitive superstition to Enlightenment 
(Randall, 1926). But for the sake of clarifying "postmodernisms," it is useful first to 
attend to less rosy postmodern descriptions of modernity (Lyotard, 1984; Murphy, 1996, 
1997; Toulmin, 1990). 
DEFINING MODERNISM 
It is no accident that the birth of modernism coincides with the end of the so-called 
"religious wars," the bloodiest of which was the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) that 
claimed the lives of nearly 40% of Germany. To the extent that "religious dogmatism" 
was successfully blamed for this otherwise politically motivated war (Cavanaugh, 1995), 
the new era in Western Europe was marked by the distrust and gradual marginalization 
of all traditional authorities and loci of learning that fail to produce mathematical-like 
certainty: theology, morality, history, language, culture, art, law, rhetoric, politics, etc. 
In a desperate attempt to shore up the newly won but fragile political peace, theoretical 
reasoning (by which absolutely certain conclusions are deduced from universally 
2 
conceded principles) was taken to be the normative form of human rationality 
(Toulmin, 1990), a place formerly held by practical reasoning (by means of which a 
course of action is selected often in the absence of logically compelling reasons). 
Common examples of practical reasoning include ethics, engineering, medicine, 
jurisprudence, and so on. But once theoretical reasoning gained prominence, the 
paragon of an individual's development was no longer taken to be the ability to think 
wisely but the ability to think mathematically and to do so under conditions of 
"autonomy" according to which the enlightened individual has shrugged off the opinions 
of everyone else (no matter how learned) and begun to think for themselves. Each bit of 
knowledge that was generated by logico-mathematical means was thought to be a 
"brick" in the single, united and monolithic "house" of human knowledge properly 
constructed upon "foundations" of incorrigible truths each of which could not be 
doubted (Descartes, 1993). (This epistemological theory is called "foundationalism"). 
Since logico-mathematical reasoning is context-independent (e.g., interior angles of 
triangles necessarily add up to 180 degrees regardless of time, place or person), the 
elevation of theoretical over practical reasoning is accompanied by four other marks of 
the modern period that likewise resulted from the loss of "context" as a working 
concept. 
First, the interior life was radically privatized. Twelve centuries before The Thirty 
Years' War, St. Augustine spoke of his journey to God as turning inwards-then-upwards 
as though human persons were closed courtyards, walled but roofless. Because they 
were roofless, human beings were open to things above them on the hierarchy such as 
God and the Church (Augustine, 1958; Cary, 2000). However in modernity, both God 
and Church had been jettisoned along with the practice of theology. Consequently, the 
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inevitable metaphor for human persons in the modern period became that of a darkened 
theater—both walled and roofed—in which the human self "in here" was cut off from the 
world of objects "out there." In the worst case scenario, the human ego is ever skeptical, 
never quite sure if the world-as-it-appears is identical with the world-as-it-really-is. In 
the best case scenario, the modern self extrapolates past all its limitations and achieves a 
bird's-eye objectivity from which vantage it passes judgment on the correspondence 
between appearance and fact, between sentences and "reality." As a result, the 
development of a good character was no longer considered to be prerequisite for reliable 
knowledge. (The medievals and ancients insisted that only "like knows like"; thus the 
Psalmist: "the pure you show yourself pure" but "with the crooked you show yourself 
perverse." Ps. 18:25, 26.) Rather, knowledge was reduced to mere information that 
could be possessed by untutored individuals and change hands without diminishment 
like coins. 
Second, once the private human subject was cut off from the public world of 
objects, the workings of language was taken to be the exclusive domain of the individual 
homunculus (the "little man" trapped inside each human body). The paradigm of 
language was photo-quality representation; words serve a relatively small role as 
"labels" that are given to things and events by the homunculus. Because a homunculus is 
locked inside the theater of each human mind, it is isolated from the world of objects  
and other people. Since each person is restricted to merely inferential awareness of 
things, language is likewise cut off from reality-out-there. Picturing has been an 
enduring metaphor for understanding an important way in which human language 
works. But in the modern era, picturing becomes the only way words are supposed to 
function. 
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A third mark arises in the tricky business of analogy. Consider the sentences "The 
dog is smart" and "The physician is smart." The word "smart" is said to be used 
analogically; the dog is smart in the same way that the doctor is smart, but to a lesser 
extent. If one proceeded mathematically (i.e., the paradigmatic way for moderns to 
proceed), the dog is thought to have some proportion of the doctor's intelligence: I.Q.dog 
=kI.Q.doctor where "k" is called the "scalar" or "scale."  
Roadmaps are wonderful examples of analogy-by-proportion. What the 
cartographer produces is almost indistinguishable from a satellite photo. The 
cartographer generates an analogous picture by dividing real distances by some factor k 
(say, 1 in. = 5 mile). The map reader runs the calculus in reverse, multiplying each inch 
on the map-picture by the same scalar, here 5 mi./in., to learn actual distances. Every 
analogy-by-proportion, whether maps or sentences, requires the user to adopt an 
imaginary bird's-eye vantage point.  
The important point is that in the modern period, analogy-by-proportion 
supplanted analogy-as-skilled-use that had been central to ancient and medieval Europe 
and continues to be important today in many non-European cultures. In such cultures, 
analogy-as-skilled-use can be illustrated by the practice of navigating by "itinerary" 
(Certeau, 2000). Because todays' streets are clearly marked in the interest of making 
modern city maps, a roadmaps can be trivially translated into a driving itinerary ("Go 
2.1 miles. Turn left on Oakwood Blvd. Proceed 1.6 miles…."). However, the reverse has 
not always been possible; in former times, picture-maps could not, and should not, be 
constructed from itineraries because itineraries contained crucial details that could not 
be conveyed by picture-maps. Learning to handle well an itinerary's details is as 
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important, if not more so, than reaching the destination, because learning to handle well 
such details constituted growth in character. 
For example, an itinerary might contain the instruction "travel west until you 
arrive at the Three Sisters…" where "Three Sisters" is a grove of pine trees in the middle 
of a meadow. Locals refuse to drop reference to "Three Sisters" when giving directions 
because the grove of pines memorializes the three women who lost their lives to save the 
47 schoolchildren, who subsequently populated the city, during the great flood of '13. In 
this example, one who becomes skilful at navigating the countryside simultaneously is to 
begin to form an empathetic relationship with the locals, namely the descendants of the 
47. 
Although shuttling between roadmaps and driving directions seems trivial in a 
world dominated by a uniform Global Positioning System, the deep instinct of 
modernity is that every itinerary can be translated into a bird's-eye-view picture-map. 
In sharp contrast, many cultures treat growing up as a journey for which no picture-map 
exists, but for which there is an itinerary. Youths are painstakingly taught to live well 
through the telling of stories, some stories being reserved until the proper time when the 
youth is developmentally ready to heed it. The collection of (canonical) stories is one 
type of moral itinerary whose timely telling to the community's children is as much a 
function of the elders' practical wisdom as it is the quality of the stories themselves. But 
if, as the modernist insists, every itinerary translates into a "picture-map," then even a 
moral itinerary was thought in to be translatable into a timeless, skill-less, context-free 
picture whose correct application no longer has anything to do with practical wisdom or 
personal character but with mathematical calculation. (In this way, even this very 
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dictionary entry epitomizes the bird's-eye definition of the entry, written so as to be 
accessible to anyone regardless of his or her stage of the journey.) 
The preference for roadmaps over itineraries is symptomatic of the 
presumptiveness of modernism (namely, that the lone and untrained individual can 
adopt a God's-eye-view at will). Further, this disposition coincides, fourth, with the 
technological mindset that seeks mastery over wholes by controlling the parts (Arendt, 
1958; Ellul, 1967). To the modern mind, a whole—a corporation, a church congregation, 
a city—is always and only an agglomeration or aggregation of parts. Parts are reliably 
controlled by exerting mechanical force from nearby. Success in control is measured in 
terms of "efficiency," which is to say, moving the parts by expending the smallest 
amount of energy necessary. 
The modern preoccupation with analysis of wholes into parts (sometimes called 
"metaphysical reductionism") has a corollary in the overly restricted view of "causation." 
The chain of cause and effect leading up to and producing an event is thought to be very 
much like the tumbling of a row of dominoes, each cause (like each domino) is a self-
contained unit that forcibly strikes its neighbor. Mechanical causation was a severe 
impoverishment of ancient and medieval accounts that in addition to efficient causation, 
found it necessary to speak also of formal, final and material causes, which could be 
found inside, outside, among and above the parts as well as simply between one part 
and its neighbor (Juarerro, 2002). But "inside," "outside," "among" and "above" are 
features that require attention to character and context, the very features abandoned by 
modernity but that have become central to the two versions of postmodernism to which 
we now turn. 
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POSTMODERN REACTIONS: THE FRENCH SCHOOL 
 
 In Continental philosophy the school of thought perhaps most closely associated 
with the term “postmodernism” is French post-structuralism.  These philosophers are 
both indebted to, but also reacted against, the "structuralism" of Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913). Likewise, they were deeply influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and often loosely associated with, but highly critical 
of, French critics of Marxism. Admittedly this is complicated business. But for purposes 
of this article, Saussure can be considered as a transition figure at the tail end of 
modernity in France.  In the English speaking world their influence has been felt mostly 
in fields dealing with literature, religious studies, and, to a lesser degree, the human 
sciences.  Theological response to post-structuralism has ranged from virulent rejection 
to wholesale appropriation to critical engagement and appropriation for the sake of 
critiquing liberal modernity (Kallenberg, 2001; Penner, 2005). But first a word about 
structuralism. 
 Saussure and the structuralists argued that signs are able to signify only by 
means of their relationship of difference to other signs.  For example, English speakers 
cannot say they know the meaning of "white" unless they understand how white is "not-
black," how "hot" is "not-cold" or "far is "not-near." That this visible mark or vocable 
("white") is recognizably not that visible mark or vocable ("black") is a necessary 
condition for spoken sounds or marks on a page to function as signs.  Thus 
structuralism understood language to function as a vast array of differences. These 
differences were taken by Saussure to be far more constitutive of language that any 
other natural or logical connection to the world referenced. In fact, one's language was 
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bigger than any and all its speakers. So large was language, that Saussure insisted that 
language organized, directed, constrained. and even constituted all conscious activity.  
Saussure classified all human thought, perception and behavior "binary 
differences" (right and left, good and bad, female and male, etc).  Because all that could 
be said, thought, experienced (and so forth) within the culture under study is 
determined by the linguistic codification at that time and place, the structuralists ended 
up focusing their investigative activities on the synchronic aspects of a culture (i.e., the 
linguistic code as it functioned at a particular slice of time and place) rather than the 
diachronic aspect of a culture (i.e., as it emerged over time). Notice that this viewpoint 
already marks a shift away from the modern priority of the individual subject.  In fact, 
the language of the cultural whole is itself the user of individuals (rather than vice versa) 
due to language’s wholesale determining of conscious and cognitive activity.  The 
epistemological program called "foundationalism" that was central to the modern or 
Enlightenment project was suddenly rendered impossible in the structuralist scheme of 
things. 
 Post-structuralism emerged when scholars loosely associated with structuralism, 
Michel Foucault (1926-84) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), appropriated Heidegger’s 
analysis of human reality and experience, “Dasein." They argued that Saussure was only 
partly correct. Not only was Dasein bound up with the vast array of linguistic 
differences, human experience was not fully intelligible from within a particular slice of 
time and place. Rather, human perception and experience had an irreducibly "timeful" 
quality.  Thus poststructuralists objected to Saussure's focus on the synchronic 
distortingly abbreviated.  Furthermore, they also radicalized the emphasis on difference 
itself by insisting that even the notion of binary differences was insufficiently attentive 
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to the all-pervasive reality of difference.  Derrida coined his now infamous term 
“differance” which is a combination of the French words equivalent to the English 
words “difference” and “deference.”  By this term he gestured towards the idea that 
language is not only composed of a series of differences but that each word in a language 
is what it is in virtue of the fact that it defers its meaning to all other terms at all other 
times and places. This means that the meaning of each word cannot be simply the 
function of its binary opposite. In this sense, the meaning of a word is "deferred" to the 
others as the meaning of all the others is partly deferred to the original word. Each term 
in turn defers its meaning to another term that is different, and so on.  Language is 
therefore an endless playing  of difference and deferral through time.  The meaning of 
any term or terms is never fully “present” in the sense that it is clearly, finally, and 
exhaustively delineated.  Thus the world that one experiences and any idea or thought 
that one has, as utterly shot through and made possible by language and therefore 
“differance,” is one in which nothing and no one are ever fully “present” to one. 
 The poststructuralist work of Derrida came to be known as deconstructionism. 
The basis of deconstructionism as an interpretive strategy is the critique of “presence” 
by the necessary operation of “differance."  Given that language is a play of difference 
and deferral, deconstructionists insist that any reading of any text is capable of being 
put into question or “de-centered.”  A text, as composed of language, is not the type of 
thing in which a single fixed interpretation may be offered.  There is no recourse to 
reference and not recourse to the author’s intention in hopes of securing once and for all 
the meaning of a text. Given the endless play of differance, neither objects referred to 
nor the author’s intention nor the text itself may be rendered fully “present” to the mind 
of the reader. The upshot of such a reading strategy is the removal from any speaker the 
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ability to claim with finality what a word, much less a text, means. Thus authoritative 
interpretation is at best an illusion and at worse a deceptive and illegitimate exercise of 
coercive power. 
 Power analysis is also central to post-structuralism, especially in the work of 
Foucault.  One easily hears echoes of Nietzsche in the post-structuralist vision of a world 
in endless flux.  Discourse, especially within institutions (social bodies that exercise 
power), are attempts to arrest the flux, but only succeed in describing the world in a 
manner that fits the interests and goals of particular persons or groups of persons.  In 
every such construal, so says Foucault, it is important to realize that the very appeal to 
rationality offered by pseudo-authorities often functions to cover over the fact that 
putatively "objective" and "rational" discourse is but a disingenuous exercise of the 
speaker's will-to-dominate.  Foucault and other post-structuralists insist that while this 
is inevitable, it is not necessarily bad. However, it is often the occasion for oppression 
and for the hiding of oppression from clear sight.  From the side of the oppressed, post-
structuralists understand as liberating the insight that language and conversations are 
the types of things that are themselves in flux, and therefore incapable of being 
impervious to critique and the play of differance. 
 To the extent that they are self-consistent, most post-structuralists may be said to 
be nomadic critics.  They deeply distrust “meta-narratives,” accounts of the world that 
purport to offer a final explanation of everything ((Lyotard, 1984)).  They take up 
positions and causes in order to have a place from which to critique dominate structures 
and ideas.  Yet they may then take up another position in order to critique the position 
from which they earlier issued critiques.  The goal is to never let any narrative become a 
master narrative that orders a community's form of life, because of the belief that each 
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such " meta-narrative" must be, and ought to be, ultimately questioned for fear that it 
becomes oppressive for occluding differences. 
 
POSTMODERN REACTIONS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SCHOOL 
The Anglo-American school has been more thoroughgoing in its resistance of 
modernism than the French school. Perhaps for this reason it has been more easily 
marginalized and dismissed as extremist. Today it remains an active but minor voice in 
departments of philosophy and theology in Western universities and seminaries, 
although its relatively meager following is thought by some of its devotees to mark it as 
belonging to the "narrow way" (Matt 7:13). In addition, Anglo-American Postmodernism 
is not as easy to describe as its nemesis, modernism. Its origins can be traced to the 
"ordinary language philosophers" of mid-20th century Cambridge and Oxford, 
respectively Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and, to a lesser extent, John L. Austin 
(1911-1960). 
Ordinary language philosophy began with the twofold observation that before one 
can tackle the question, "How does knowledge come about?" (epistemology), it is 
necessary to get a handle on "How do words mean?" Plenty of modernists thought 
everyday language was in a pitiable state, because so many senses were connoted by any 
single word. (Does "cleave" really mean to chop or to join together?) So, they set out to 
repair language, even to create an ideal language, by means of a system of universal 
linguistic rules. Each proposed system of linguistic rules was founded upon the notion 
that proposition are pictures of "states of affairs," which is to say, events and things in a 
given constellation. (For a severe example, logical positivists held that truthfulness of 
each sentence had to be verifiable by one of the five senses in order for that sentence to 
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be regarded as a legitimate sentence.)  What enables language-as-picture to work was 
thought to be "ostensive definitions," for example, the ability to point to that car, that 
tree, that crash. But Wittgenstein observed that a great deal of training precedes 
pointing: "Point to a piece of paper.—And now point to its shape—now to its color—now 
to its number…" (Wittgenstein, 1953, §33). Truth is, human speakers reflexively know 
which of many aspects an object is being pointed to because they already are experts in 
reading physical and conversational contexts. In short, they are already masters of an 
entire language.  
Wittgenstein observed that as a child becomes fluent in ordinary language, the 
child comes into direct and robust contact with the world. In contrast to the modernist's 
position, Wittgenstein insisted that such linguistically framed contact cannot even be 
intelligibly doubted. For example, the modern skeptic while standing in a rainstorm 
claims ability to doubt, "How do I know that I am wet?" This may sound ridiculous. But 
for the modern thinker, the appearance of being wet must be inferred from sensory 
data, and inference never quite achieves certainty. But Wittgenstein dissolved the 
problematic by observing that the skeptic has already given the game away by using the 
appropriate adjective: "Wet"! Thus, the fitting way to answer skeptic's question, "How 
do I know I am wet?" is the simple reply, "Because you speak English" (Wittgenstein, 
1953, §381). 
In contrast to the views of modern thinkers, for whom language is private and 
piecemeal (the homunculus successively labels each sensation with a word: "I," "wet," 
"cold," "tired"), language is taken to be exceedingly broad by Anglo-American 
postmoderns. Language is the very medium of thinking and experiencing and relating. 
In contrast to modernist theories, instances of language are not held up against "reality" 
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and measured for their correspondence (or lack thereof). Rather, language is the very 
means by which the world is knowable and known.i  
For the postmoderns, language is never merely words and sentences. For every 
instance of language-use  displays grammar. The grammatical rules are not so much 
prescriptive (e.g., "Plural forms of transitive verbs must take plural objects.") as they are 
descriptive of the underlying conditions of intelligibility. But neither is "grammar" ever 
simply the rules for building sentences out of words. Rather, grammar is the 
constellation of actions and shared judgments and objects seen against a whole field of 
word-use. Thus it is a crucial part of the grammar of the word "chair" that we sit in 
chairs (Wittgenstein, 1958, 24). To become fluent in using the word "chair," we learn 
that chairs are the sorts of things that we sit on—but never marry or deceive! Multiple 
generations of Wittgensteinians continue his practice of rendering perspicuous the 
"grammar" of ordinary language-use in order to dissolve philosophical puzzles arising 
from neglect of the workings of ordinary language. In this way, Wittgenstein's 
postmodern "philosophy-as-therapy" has been likened to Socrates' premodern 
philosophical therapy. 
The modern quest for a totalizing explanation of everything has been dealt a severe 
blow by the hard sciences. While it once was thought that all physical systems reduce to 
the movement of their smallest parts, only a very small percentage of physical systems 
qualify as "linear" for the reductionist description to hold (e.g., billiard balls colliding on 
a table approximate a linear system.) With the discovery that many, perhaps even the 
vast majority, of natural systems are "non-linear" (or "chaotic"), modernists are being 
forced to admit that systems ranging from the weather to church congregations are 
dynamic and so do not succumb to totalizing explanation. Wholes often achieve unique 
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lives of their own while exercising top-down influence on their parts (Peacocke, 1979). 
Because of the complex interplay of parts and wholes, to understand each bit, it becomes 
necessary to study the bit in the greater contexts in which this bit is embedded. If the 
"bit" is a human person, attention must be given not only to the molecular, but 
knowledge is enriched by paying close attention to the social, historical, political and 
linguistic dimensions of life. Even more to the point for the individual embedded in a 
host of dynamic systems, the way forward into an uncharted and humanly unchartable 
future, is his or her need for practical wisdom. Responding well in such ambiguous 
circumstances can make little use of mathematical-like certainty. Rather, what is longed 
for and needed is training in the art and skills of practical reasoning.  
As linguistic fluency itself belongs to the skills of practical reason, Anglo-American 
Postmodernists have sought to return all forms of practical reasoning (notably, analogy-
as-skilled-use) to their former place of prominence over theoretical reasoning (and its 
theoretic counterpart, analogy-as-proportion). Moreover, even in cases in which 
theoretical reasoning is appropriate, the central metaphor for understanding the action 
of theoretical reasoning has been changed from a "house" (foundationalism) to a 
communally owned and operated "web of belief" (Quine & Ullian, 1978).  
Finally, Anglo-American postmodern have given up the modern notion that human 
subjects are cut off from the world of objects and persons. While moderns consider 
human selves as trapped inside the theater of the mind with at best inferential contact 
with the world "out there," on the postmodernism view, human subjects do not need 
empirical inferences to overcome isolation. Rather, each and every person is already 
embedded in the world of practices, narratives, relations, virtue formation, and 
historical traditions (Hauerwas & Jones, 1989; MacIntyre, 1984, 1988). Unlike the 
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modernist claim, one's true identity is not discovered by doubting these externals. These 
externals constitute the human self.  
In these ways, postmodernism a wholesale abandonment of the entire Modern 
project. 
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i Aquinas said something similar about ideas as "that by which" something is known in Summa 
Theologica I.85.2. This parallel between Thomas and Wittgenstein has resulted in a growing number of 
Wittgensteinian Thomists such as David Burrell and Fergus Kerr. 
